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Abstract 
Looking around the world, there are various models that have been used in the design of anti-
discrimination laws.  In this paper I compare the model used by Canada, which has a 
reputation for being a leader in addressing inequality, and the model used in Australia which 
has come to be seen as an international laggard.  Canada’s open model provides much 
discretion to the courts to identify what constitutes discrimination and legitimate 
justifications.  With this scope for interpretation the courts are free to establish principles and, 
importantly, also to revise them over time as society changes.  Australia, on the other hand, 
chose a more closed model, precisely defining a formula for direct discrimination and indirect 
discrimination, on specific grounds in specific areas, and with specific exceptions.  
In Australia there is growing evidence of our laws’ limitations and growing interest in 
legislative reform.  In exploring legal reforms, I suggest that we need to consider changing not 
merely the legislative prescription but also the prescriptiveness of our model.  Rewriting the 
definitions without taking a look at the bigger picture of what role our judges could and 
should play might help to solve a particular problem but leave us with a regulatory framework 
that is still ill-equipped to evolve over time.  We need to re-examine both the legitimacy and 
capacity of our courts to take on a greater role in the protection of human rights, and 
specifically the promotion of substantive equality, in Australia.   
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Introduction 
In drafting Australian anti-discrimination laws choices were made about the scope and 
model of legal regulation.  After more than 30 years of these laws it is timely to ask:  are 
they well equipped to promote equality?  They appear to have played a role in reducing 
both blatant forms of discrimination that reflected and reinforced prejudice toward 
marginalised groups such as racial minorities, and blanket kinds of exclusion such as 
company policies against hiring women as pilots, mechanics or miners.  The significance 
of these achievements should not be underestimated, but opening doors and permitting 
entry does not necessarily challenge the pre-existing criteria, rules and power structures.  
Now everyone may be allowed to play the game, but their success will still largely 
depend upon their likeness to the entrenched norm of ‘benchmark man’.1  Substantive 
equality means enabling not merely allowing full and equal participation, dignity and 
respect.  The more specific question then is whether our laws are well equipped to 
promote substantive rather than merely formal equality.   
In this paper I compare the model of anti-discrimination laws used by Canada, a leader in 
addressing inequality, and the model used in Australia, which has come to be seen as an 
international laggard (Chaney and Rees 2004: 9).  In Australia there is growing evidence 
of our laws’ limitations (e.g., Smith 2008; Roberts 2005; Rattigan 2004; Campbell 2007) 
and growing interest in legislative reform.2  Are there lessons we might learn from the 
Canadians? 
Open and closed models of anti-discrimination laws 
When using law in seeking to regulate behaviour, one issue of design is how to set the 
standard of desired behaviour.  In proscribing discrimination, models around the world 
range in different ways.  One categorisation is on a sliding scale from ‘open’ to ‘closed’ 
in respect of the definition of the discrimination that is prohibited (Heringa 1999: 25-37).  
In an open model discrimination is very generally defined leaving it largely up to the 
courts to determine what constitutes discrimination and when, if ever, discrimination is 
justified or permissible.  This description matches the Canadian model.  The alternative 
model, used in Australia, is a closed one in which prohibited discrimination is carefully 
and precisely defined, leaving less discretion to the courts.   
To see the operation of these different models we can look at the different ways in which 
discrimination is defined under each.  The definition of discrimination is central to the 
operation and effect of anti-discrimination laws in a number of ways.  The definition is 
the legislative characterisation of the problem and determines the nature of the right to be 
free of discrimination.  If discrimination is defined too narrowly, it will only operate to 
address a narrow band of discrimination and promote a limited form of equality.  If the 
definition is too complex or difficult to prove, the law will be less enforceable and thus 
less effective at changing behaviour.  If the law is very general or wide, there may be 
uncertainty about its meaning and reliance upon the courts to develop clear and workable 
principles.  There appears to be a trade-off between certainty and flexibility. 
                                                
1 This term was coined by Margaret Thornton:  Margaret Thornton, The Liberal Promise:  Anti-
Discrimination Legislation in Australia, Oxford University Press, 1990. 
2 See, for example, the report of the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs 
‘Effectiveness of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) In Eliminating Discrimination and Promoting 
Gender Equality’ December 2008. 
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Canadian open model 
A typical Canadian equality law prohibits discrimination in employment in the following 
way:  
Discrimination in employment 
13 (1) A person must not 
(a) refuse to employ or refuse to continue to employ a person, or 
(b) discriminate against a person regarding employment or any term or condition of 
employment 
because of the race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, political belief, religion, marital 
status, family status, physical or mental disability, sex, sexual orientation or age of that 
person or because that person has been convicted of a criminal or summary conviction 
offence that is unrelated to the employment or to the intended employment of that 
person. 
. . . 
(4) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply with respect to a refusal, limitation, specification 
or preference based on a bona fide occupational requirement.3 
Under this formulation, a person applying for a job or who is already employed must not 
be excluded or treated less favourably ‘because of’ one of the listed characteristics, if the 
characteristic is unrelated to the employment, unless the employer can prove that the 
discrimination was justified because of a ‘bona fide occupational requirement’.  Notably 
there is no precise definition of discrimination; it was left to the courts to determine the 
nature of discrimination, the meaning of ‘bona fide requirement’ and the onus in respect 
of this element. 
In seeking to understand the nature of discrimination, the starting point usually is the 
notion of direct discrimination, or different treatment.  This is premised on a notion of 
formal equality or ‘treating likes alike’ and covers blanket and blatant kinds of 
discrimination, such as ‘women need not apply’.  However, the challenge for courts 
faced with open or general prohibitions like the Canadian one has been to decide whether 
and how other forms of discrimination are to be prohibited.  An alternative form of 
discrimination is one that results not from such category-based distinctions, but from the 
unfair disproportionate impact of apparently neutral rules.  A minimum height 
requirement for a job, for example, does not single out women for different treatment but 
would disproportionately exclude them.  This ‘indirect’ form of discrimination would not 
be covered by a narrow definition or interpretation that merely required the same 
treatment of similarly situated individuals.   
The Canadian courts, following on from the American judgement of Griggs v Duke 
Power in 1971, extended their initial interpretation of discrimination to include this 
adverse impact or indirect form of discrimination (Ontario Human Rights Commission 
and O’Malley v. Simpsons-Sears Ltd).  The question of whether the discrimination was 
justifiable because it was a bona fide occupational requirement – and thus not unlawful – 
was to be a matter for the employer or respondent to prove.  The courts thus established 
this bifurcated definition of discrimination as the conventional approach under Canadian 
human rights law, as summarised in Meiorin (at 19):   
                                                
3 Human Rights Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 210 
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The conventional approach to applying human rights legislation in the workplace 
requires the tribunal to decide at the outset into which of two categories the case falls: (1) 
“direct discrimination”, where the standard is discriminatory on its face, or (2) “adverse 
effect discrimination”, where the facially neutral standard discriminates in effect. 
Another question faced by the courts was to decide on the significance given to the 
distinction between direct and indirect discrimination.  Importantly, in Canada, whether a 
matter was characterised by the court as being direct or indirect discrimination came to 
be of great significance as it determined both the defences available to the respondent 
and the nature of the remedy the court could order.     
However, in the 1999 case of Meiorin the Supreme Court of Canada concluded that the 
distinction between direct and indirect discrimination was too malleable to allow so 
much to turn on it, and the bifurcated approach could ‘compromise both the broad 
purposes and the specific terms’ of human rights legislation.4  Importantly, since the 
bifurcated definition had been developed by the courts to give effect to the general 
wording of the statute, it was open to the Supreme Court to reconsider that approach.  
And it did:  The Court abandoned the bifurcated approach and adopted instead a unified 
approach that allows the court to focus on whether an employer’s exclusionary standard 
is imposed for a purpose rationally connected with the job, that it is applied in good faith 
for that purpose, and that the standard is reasonably necessary for achievement of that 
purpose.  Importantly, the test requires the job criteria or standard to be justified, 
alternatives to be assessed, and special needs of targeted employees to be accommodated 
up to unjustifiable hardship. This revised test: removed the legal distinction between 
direct and indirect discrimination; and enabled the court to examine the legitimacy of the 
employer’s goal in imposing the standard or criteria, and the appropriateness of the 
means by which the goal was to be achieved. 
It is important at this stage to note a distinction between what a court is permitted to do 
and what it is prepared to do.  While it was the open model, which allowed the Supreme 
Court to develop and revise the interpretation of discrimination under these statutes, this 
does not necessarily explain its willingness to do so in this progressive way.  In its 
interpretation of the constitutional equality provisions in the Charter, the Supreme Court 
of Canada has demonstrated a sophisticated appreciation of the distinction between 
formal and substantive equality and, notably, has explicitly adopted a substantive 
equality approach (Eldridge v British Columbia (Attorney General); Vriend v Alberta).  
This approach to constitutional interpretation clearly influenced the Court in developing 
the principles for interpreting statutory anti-discrimination laws. 
Australia’s closed model 
The current state of anti-discrimination laws and equality jurisprudence in Australia 
reflects a very different picture.  There is no constitutional equality guarantee, only a 
patchwork of overlapping and intersecting federal and state Acts that have been 
interpreted in an increasingly narrow and formalistic way.   
By the time Australia enacted its first anti-discrimination laws, in the 1970s, the United 
States’ courts had already developed the distinction between direct and indirect 
discrimination (Griggs v Duke Power).  The United Kingdom government had picked up 
                                                
4 The Court gave seven reasons for adopting the new approach:  Meiorin [1999] 3 SCR 3, [25]-[49]. 
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this distinction and enacted prescriptive or closed legislation that specifically defined 
discrimination as direct and indirect, limited grounds upon which discrimination was 
prohibited and a limited range of exceptions.  The Australian governments were thus 
faced with a choice about whether to enact an open model like the US or a closed model 
like the UK.   
The model that has become the standard in Australia reflects the UK drafting5 by 
specifically defining discrimination to have two forms – direct and indirect.  As in the 
UK, Australian drafters appear to have simply tried to codify the judicial principles that 
had already emerged in the US.  In this way, although late in being enacted the 
Australian legislation may have made up some time by starting with these judicial 
principles rather than having to wait for cases to be brought to the courts so that the 
courts could develop these principles.   
However, setting such detail into legislation had the effect of establishing a model in 
Australia of parliamentary prescription over judicial discretion.  Giving the courts so 
little discretion may have been smart and progressive at the time, but it also reflects a 
narrow view about the role of judges in a democratic society and certainly places a 
significant burden on legislatures to ensure the law evolves over time as society changes.     
Looking at the Australian model, the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (DDA) 
for instance, defines discrimination on the ground of disability in the following way: 
5  Disability discrimination 
(1) For the purposes of this Act, a person (discriminator) discriminates 
against another person (aggrieved person) on the ground of a disability of the 
aggrieved person if, because of the aggrieved person’s disability, the 
discriminator treats or proposes to treat the aggrieved person less favourably 
than, in circumstances that are the same or are not materially different, the 
discriminator treats or would treat a person without the disability. 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), circumstances in which a person 
treats or would treat another person with a disability are not materially different 
because of the fact that different accommodation or services may be required by 
the person with a disability. 
6  Indirect disability discrimination 
For the purposes of this Act, a person (discriminator) discriminates against 
another person (aggrieved person) on the ground of a disability of the aggrieved 
person if the discriminator requires the aggrieved person to comply with a 
requirement or condition: 
(a) with which a substantially higher proportion of persons without the 
disability comply or are able to comply; and 
(b) which is not reasonable having regard to the circumstances of the case; and 
(c) with which the aggrieved person does not or is not able to comply. 
The first thing to note is how complicated this definition is, relative to the Canadian one 
set out above.  In seeking to codify direct and indirect discrimination, the meaning of the 
statute has been obscured substantially.  And, this is only the definition of disability 
                                                
5 While the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) (RDA) adopted the open words of the international 
convention underpinning it, that Act remains peculiar among Australian anti-discrimination laws. 
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discrimination, set out separately are the prohibitions.  Three other federal Acts provide 
three other definitions.  Notably, under this model there is no general justification type of 
exception, but a range of specific and limited exceptions listed for each particular 
ground, many plainly reflecting nothing more than political compromise.   
A number of consequences flow from this level of prescription.  Firstly, arguably the 
statutes’ complexity has undermined the development of a deep and sophisticated public 
understanding of the notions of discrimination and commitment to equality.  Compliance 
and norm development depend at least in part on parties understanding their obligations 
and rights.  Even the High Court has struggled to understand them, asserting that in 
defining ‘discrimination in this manner language has been employed which is both 
complex and obscure and productive of further disputation.’ (IW v Perth at 137 per 
Gummow J). Secondly, the detailed prescription prompts actors, accused of 
discrimination, to look for loopholes to evade liability.   Finally, the task faced by the 
courts becomes one that is focussed on statutory interpretation, seeking to make sense of 
wordy and convoluted sections, with limited scope for developing general principles. 
These points are demonstrated in the recent High Court case of Purvis v New South 
Wales (Dept of Education and Training). A student with multiple disabilities was 
expelled from a school because of behaviour, which was a manifestation of his disability.  
The student brought a claim of direct discrimination, arguing that in being expelled 
because of his behaviour he had been treated differently to non-disabled students.  
Instead of the focus being on what it would take to give effect to substantive equality for 
this student in his education, the question for the Court became a highly technical and 
artificial one:  with whom should the student be compared - a non-disabled student who 
was well behaved or one who shared the same behavioural problems?   The Court chose 
the former and found that the school had not discriminated because it treated this 
disabled student the same as it would treat all students who behaved that way.   
In making this decision, the Court clarified and reinforced a stark distinction between 
direct and indirect discrimination, in contrast to the direction of Canadian jurisprudence.   
The new approach means that the prohibition on direct discrimination merely requires 
employers and education providers to ‘treat likes alike’ and, importantly, lets the 
employer or school decide who is like whom (Smith 2008). Direct discrimination 
provisions do not prevent employers (education providers, etc) from using criteria that 
very closely connect or overlap with traits that are supposedly protected by the anti-
discrimination laws.  For example, while an employer may be prohibited from applying a 
blanket exclusion of women, direct discrimination provisions allow the employer to 
choose the candidate who can work 24/7, can do overtime on short notice, will not take 
extended leave, will not take their entitlement to carer’s leave or any other criteria that 
may have a gendered element but is not expressly ‘sex’. Further, under direct 
discrimination actions, such criteria are not subjected to any evaluation of legitimacy or 
connectedness to the job and there is no obligation to provide reasonable 
accommodation. The Purvis decision removes the criteria from judicial scrutiny and 
makes clear that reasonable adjustments are not required.   
The indirect discrimination provisions are still available to challenge such criteria, but 
with all the uncertainty and litigation difficulties that indirect discrimination provisions 
entail.  The Purvis precedent makes discrimination litigation even more complex and 
significantly limits the progressive potential of Australian anti-discrimination laws.   The 
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artificiality and complexity of the distinction between direct and indirect discrimination 
is particularly problematic given that in Australia it is victims alone who must prove 
breaches of our anti-discrimination laws.   
Conclusion - Lessons for Australia? 
Implications of the Purvis precedent have been noted by a number of commentators, and 
legislative reform has been recommended.  In reforming our definition of discrimination, 
the unified approach adopted by Canada has much to offer.  Firstly, it ensures that 
victims of discrimination are not unduly burdened by the challenge of trying to figure out 
whether their experience fits into the artificially distinct categories of direct or indirect 
discrimination.  This is a difficult task and one that currently matters a lot as the choice 
of action determines what needs to be proven and, as Purvis showed, whether the 
respondent’s criteria or practice can be scrutinised for anything other than its consistent 
application and whether any accommodation is required of the respondent.  Secondly, the 
test ensures that the criteria used to select (and exclude) employees or applicants is 
subjected to some assessment of legitimacy in light of the goals of our equality laws.  
Importantly, the Canadian test also allows for an assessment of the reasonableness of the 
means by which an employer seeks to achieve its goals and, into this is built a limited 
obligation on employers to accommodate difference or make reasonable adjustments to 
the extent of undue hardship.   
However, in exploring legal reforms, we should at least consider changing not merely the 
legislative prescription but also the prescriptiveness of our model.  Rewriting the 
definitions without taking a look at the bigger picture of what role our judges could and 
should play might help to solve a particular problem but leave us with a regulatory 
framework that is still ill-equipped to evolve over time.  Some would argue that courts 
lack democratic legitimacy in determining the meaning of substantive equality, but is this 
taking a narrowly majoritarian view of democracy?  Others argue that courts are not 
sufficiently representative of our diverse citizenship to be able to appreciate fully the 
experience of discrimination and I accept that this argument has significant strength.  The 
limited effectiveness of our anti-discrimination laws and the absence of a deep and 
sophisticated understanding and commitment to equality in Australia simply leads me to 
suggest that we need to question not merely the specific legal rules but also the wider 
framework.  We need to re-examine both the legitimacy and capacity of our courts to 
take on a greater role in the protection of human rights, and specifically the promotion of 
substantive equality, in Australia.   
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